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Prior to the New Deal almost all public social welfare spending, or what
contemporaries called “relief,” was provided by local governments. The
administration of local public relief had long been associated with patron-
age, political manipulation, and corruption. Between 1933 and 1940, fed-
eral, state, and local governments combined to spend $2 billion per year to
provide relief to at least 2 million cases (families) per month. In 1933, when
unemployment reached 25 percent, the federal government introduced a
relief program redistributing 4 percent of gross national product (GNP) to
a quarter of all the nation’s families. The possibility of providing cash pay-
ments to a quarter of the nation’s families oﬀered an opportunity for cor-
ruption unique in the nation’s history. Surprisingly, however, while the ad-
ministration of public relief was widely regarded as corrupt before 1933,
the modern federal/state public welfare system that developed out of the
New Deal reforms is often castigated as bureaucratic, but rarely corrupt.
What changed? How did the country enter the Depression with a public
welfare system riddled with political manipulation and emerge with one
that was not?
Our answer is straightforward. The president, Franklin Roosevelt, and
other members of the executive branch gained little or nothing from the
kinds of local corruption involved in public relief. But they stood to incur
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neth Sokoloﬀ, and the conference participants for helpful comments.enormous losses if the New Deal relief program was perceived as politi-
cally manipulative and corrupt by the voting public. Roosevelt and the
Democrats brought relief to millions of families every month, and the grat-
itude of relief recipients was Roosevelt’s political payoﬀ. Other politi-
cians—senators, representatives, governors, and mayors—wanted to con-
trol relief and use it for political gain. Both houses of Congress, the states,
and local governments maneuvered, manipulated, and cajoled to get their
hands on a share of the billions spent each year on relief. Although Roo-
sevelt made substantial concessions to Congress and to state and local gov-
ernments in the administration of relief, he sought to curb corruption at
the state and local level by his inﬂuence over the discretionary allocation of
relief funds, by establishing oﬃces to investigate complaints of corruption,
and, in the long run, by bureaucratizing the administration of public wel-
fare. During the New Deal, when the relief programs were reorganized to
give the Roosevelt administration more control over the distribution of
funds within states, it used that control to limit state and local political ma-
nipulation and increased the responsiveness of the allocation of funds
within states to the high-minded goals of relief, recovery, and reform. Pol-
itics was paramount in the structure of New Deal relief programs; it just
turned out that the best political outcome meant a reduction in corruption
at the state and local level. This does not mean that Roosevelt did not use
the administration of relief for his own political ends. There is ample evi-
dence that presidential politics mattered in the distribution of relief funds.
Corruption by others was curbed because it was in Roosevelt’s political in-
terest to see it curbed.
We begin by discussing the types of corruption involved with relief dur-
ing the New Deal. We present a brief overview of the New Deal programs,
followed by a more detailed history. We then trace how political inﬂuences
shaped the administration of relief programs and document how relief ad-
ministered by the national government diﬀered from relief administered by
states.
11.1 Deﬁning Corruption and Political Manipulation
Corruption has many dimensions. During the Great Depression the
New Deal Democrats were often accused of “playing politics with relief.”
This dimension might be considered corruption by some observers or po-
litical business as usual by others. Whatever we called it, the way relief
could be used for personal or political gain clearly diﬀered by level of gov-
ernment. Roosevelt explicitly stated the goals of the New Deal as “relief,
recovery, and reform.” A growing political economy literature has tried to
evaluate whether Roosevelt pursued those goals or whether he used New
Deal policies, particularly the allocation of federal grants among the
344 John Joseph Wallis, Price V. Fishback, and Shawn Kantorstates, to pursue political goals.1For example, if the level of unemployment
in states did not aﬀect the allocation of relief spending across states, but the
margin of Roosevelt’s victory in the 1930s presidential election did aﬀect
allocations, this is evidence that Roosevelt was playing politics with relief.
At the state level, governors occasionally required administrative employ-
ees to make contributions to political parties. At the local level, political
machines were often accused of selecting from potential relief recipients on
the basis of party or requiring recipients to vote for machine candidates.
These are all examples of politicians using the administration of relief to
further their political ambitions, in the large and in the small.
Clear examples of corruption occurred through time-honored methods
of fraud and featherbedding. For example, relief workers could be assigned
to work on projects that beneﬁted private landowners rather than the
public;2 suppliers could overbill for materials and make kickbacks to proj-
ect supervisors;3 or workers could pad their hours and receive beneﬁts for
work they never performed.4 At their margins, these criminal types of cor-
ruption may be indistinguishable from playing politics. But they are sub-
stantively diﬀerent enough that reducing political manipulation requires
diﬀerent policies than reducing criminal corruption. It appears that the
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1. The literature begins with Arrington (1969, 1970), Reading (1973), and Wright (1974)
and continues in Wallis (1984, 1987, 1991). Anderson and Tollison (1991) criticized Wright
and Wallis for not including congressional information, which led to the response by Wallis
(1998) and the exchange between Fleck (2001) and Wallis (2001). Couch and Shugart (1998
and 2000) examined New Deal spending as well. Investigation of the determinants of county
allocations and a summary of the entire literature can be found in Fishback, Kantor, and Wal-
lis (2003). The overall ﬁscal implications of the New Deal for national, state, and local gov-
ernments is discussed in Wallis and Oates (1998).
2. A restriction on the “extension or improvement of streets and utilities in relatively un-
derdeveloped areas . . . was the direct result of cases developed by the Division [of Investiga-
tion], some of which were prosecuted in Federal courts, showing that, at times and through
subterfuge, real estate ﬁrms or developing companies, for example, sought to divert relief
funds to their own beneﬁt in constructing streets and private utilities in undeveloped areas to
the enhancement of the value of the real estate owned by them” (WPA Division of Investiga-
tion 1943, p. 7).
3. “This type of case involved the submission of false time claims to the government in the
rental of equipment; the short delivery of materials to WPA projects by venders, at times in
collusion with WPA supervisory employees; or the furnishing of equipment or material be-
low the speciﬁcations of the contract which resulted in loss to the Government. Cases of this
character frequently involved considerable amounts of money....  I n  this connection, it
should be remembered that the Works Projects Administration operated a program consist-
ing of projects which ranged from the building of two miles of farm-to-market road in Texas,
to the construction of LaGuardia Airport at New York City” (WPA Division on Investiga-
tion 1943, p. 23).
4. “Due to the fact that the program employed large numbers of people, frequently in
rather small units, an operation involving the preparation of a vast number of payrolls, irreg-
ularities in connection with these payrolls were the most common type of complaint. These
irregularities in general consisted of normal and routine “padding” operations in which per-
sons were paid for time when they were absent from their WPA duties or were dually em-
ployed” (WPA Division of Investigation 1943, p. 21).New Deal was successful at reducing some forms of political corruption in
the administration of welfare. Fraud, however, will always be with us, and
its reduction requires eternal vigilance.5
The administrative structure of a government program limits the meth-
ods available to combat corruption. In general, corruption depends on ad-
ministrative discretion. Oﬃcials can be corrupt only if they have some lee-
way to make decisions. The creation of rules and procedures is one way to
limit corruption. For example, Roosevelt could only play politics with the
allocation of relief funds between the states if the executive branch pos-
sessed the power to allocate funds at their discretion. If funds are allocated
by a formula or a rule—for example, equal per capita grants or matching
grants—the federal administrator does not possess the option of playing
politics along this dimension. Similarly, if a local case worker has the dis-
cretion to set the monthly relief beneﬁt for each case, he or she has much
more opportunity to be corrupt than if relief beneﬁts per case are ﬁxed.
While discretion and rules are, to a certain extent, substitutes as govern-
ing devices, it is rarely possible to construct an administrative mechanism
without some discretion. In the hectic days of 1933 it was extremely diﬃ-
cult to come up with sensible rules. As a result, the key aspect of adminis-
trative structure was who had administrative discretion. Was it lodged with
the national government, with the president, or with the state and local
governments? Our central hypothesis maintains that political manipula-
tion at the state and local level in the administration of federal relief funds
was reduced when administrative discretion lay with the executive branch
of the national government. Criminal corruption was reduced by the
promulgation of rules and vigorous prosecution of oﬀenders. The tests of
this proposition developed in the empirical section depend, of course, on
identifying political manipulation or criminal corruption, and then distin-
guishing whether corruption was addressed by creating rules or changing
the location of administrative discretion.
11.2 A Brief History
The history of the New Deal relief programs falls into two eras: from
May 1933 to the summer of 1935, and after the summer of 1935. The peri-
ods are distinguished by the amount of administrative discretion exercised
by the national government and the discretion remaining in the hands of
state and local oﬃcials. Table 11.1provides a list of the major New Deal re-
lief programs. The ﬁrst columns of the table give the beginning and ending
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5. The evidence for the New Deal’s success at eliminating political corruption is the virtual
absence of complaints, for example, that party orientation of a recipient has any impact on
the probability of getting a Social Security check or an Aid for Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) payment. Evidence that political corruption was important before the New
Deal is presented in the historical section.dates for each program (several Social Security programs are still in force).
The last column classiﬁes programs by their administrative character: that
is, how discretion was allocated within the program. In “national” pro-
grams the national government exerted a preponderance of administrative
inﬂuence. In “federal” programs state and local governments shared ad-
ministrative discretion with the national government and in many pro-
grams possessed the preponderance of inﬂuence. Table 11.2 lists the aver-
age monthly number of cases receiving relief for the nation as a whole and
for each of the major relief programs.
In the spring of 1933 the Federal Emergency Relief Act created the Fed-
eral Emergency Relief Administration, known as FERA, the largest and
most important relief program up to 1935. Roosevelt chose Harry Hopkins
as the FERA administrator. The original act appropriated $500 million to
be allocated among the states, half on a matching basis and half at the dis-
cretion of the administrator. Once funds were granted, however, FERA
funds legally became the property of the states. Hopkins attempted to raise
the standards of relief administration, but his ability to do so was limited
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Table 11.1 Major relief programs, dates, and administrative character
Started Ended Agency Administration
May 1933 Fall 1935a Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) Federal
April 1933 July 1942 Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC) National
November 1933 March 1934 Civil Works Administration (CWA) National
Spring 1935 1942 Works Progress/Projects Administration (WPA) National/federal
1935 1994b Rural Electriﬁcation Administration (REA) National
1937 1946c Farm Security Administration (FSA) National
Summer 1935 Present Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) National
Summer 1935 Present Unemployment insurance Federal
Summer 1935 1974d Old Age Assistance (OAA)c Federal
Summer 1935 1974d Aid to the Blindc Federal
Summer 1935 1996e Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)d Federal
Sources: National Resources Planning Board (1942, pp. 26–97); Fishback and Thomasson (forthcom-
ing); Alston and Ferrie (1999, pp. 91–98); Columbia University Press (2005).
Notes: “Federal administration” refers to joint administration by the state and national governments.
“National administration” refers to programs administered by the national government. General relief
was provided by local governments throughout the period.
aSome FERA projects were phased out over a period lasting through March 1937.
bThe Rural Electriﬁcation Administration in 1949 was authorized to make loans for telephone improve-
ments and in 1988 was permitted to give interest-free loans for job creation and rural electric systems.
Its duties were assumed by the Rural Utilities Service when it was abolished in 1994.
cThe Farm Security Administration took over the role played by the Resettlement Administration begun
in 1935. Some of its programs were eventually taken over by the Farmers Home Administration in 1947.
dOld age assistance and aid to the blind were almost entirely superseded by the Supplemental Security
Income Program in 1974.
eAid to Dependent Children was renamed Aid to Families with Dependent Children in 1962, and the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.by  the relative independence of state relief administrations. Hopkins
could, and did, threaten to withhold federal grants for relief to states with
corrupt, politically manipulative, or ineﬃcient relief administrations.
Withholding funds, however, was a blunt policy tool that worked to the
direct disadvantage of the unemployed in the state, in contradiction to
FERA’s mandate.
In 1935, Roosevelt submitted an “economic security act” to Congress.
As passed, the act provided a permanent, nationally administered program
of old age insurance, which we call Social Security today. It also provided
for a national payroll tax for unemployment insurance programs run by the
individual states; 90 percent of the payroll taxes paid in each state were
held in trust for that state. Finally, the act provided relief for three cate-
gories of persons: old age assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to depend-
ent children. The categorical programs were ﬁnanced from general rev-
enues and allocated among the state by strict matching grants. Federal
grants to states were determined solely by state expenditures. As a result, it
was the states, and not the federal government, that controlled spending on
the categorical programs.
The second element of the 1935 reforms was the creation of an “emer-
gency” relief program, funded by a series of ongoing emergency relief ap-
propriation acts. Under the act of 1935, Roosevelt created the Works Pro-
gress Administration (WPA) and a number of smaller relief programs: the
National Youth Administration (NYA), the Rural Electriﬁcation Admin-
istration (REA), the Farm Security Administration (FSA), and others. The
WPA, also headed by Hopkins, was structured so that Roosevelt could
make discretionary allocations between the states, and, importantly, WPA
oﬃcials retained the right to approve individual projects within states.
Over time, Congress required a larger degree of state and local participa-
tion. This moved the WPA closer to a matching program, but matching was
never complete. The WPA also ﬁnanced a number of nationally adminis-
tered programs in the arts—theater, literature, and history—that did not
have state or local sponsors. After the summer of 1935, the WPA was the
largest single relief program.
Our hypothesis is that Roosevelt found it in his interest to reduce cor-
ruption and political manipulation, particularly at the state and local lev-
els, while Congress and state and local governments continued to press for
a relief structure that allowed them to use relief to their own political ad-
vantage. The key element, therefore, was the allocation of administrative
discretion. If the president possessed administrative and ﬁscal discretion,
he and Hopkins could reduce corruption and political manipulation at the
state and local levels. Likewise, if state and local relief administrators pos-
sessed administrative and ﬁscal discretion, they could pursue their own
political ends. Accordingly, our empirical approach considers the develop-
ment of administrative policy. We examine the speciﬁc role that adminis-
Roosevelt’s Eﬀorts to Control Corruption during the New Deal 349trative discretion played in the diﬀerence between Senate and House ver-
sions of bills, diﬀerences that correspond directly to the interests of state
and local governments. We also compare the allocation of funds within the
states under FERA and the WPA. Hopkins possessed a much wider range
of policy instruments to control the distribution of federal funds within
states under the WPA, and we expect and ﬁnd that the allocation of WPA
spending diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the FERA allocations. When Roo-
sevelt and Hopkins gained more discretion over the distribution of funds
within the states, they paid more attention to promoting relief, recovery,
and reform and to reducing fraud and other forms of illegal corruption.
11.3 Early Relief: 1933 to 1935
Early twentieth-century American social welfare policy had its roots in
the English Poor Law. Relief was administered locally through a complex
network of public and private agencies, ranging from the poorhouse to the
Community Chest, that assessed need and distributed beneﬁts. The intel-
lectual high ground in the emerging ﬁeld of social work was dominated by
private, rather than public, organizations. The centuries-old debate over
using relief to care for the truly needy as opposed to providing a dole for
the idle, shiftless, and worthless produced a philosophy of social welfare fo-
cused on the individual case. Social workers identiﬁed the deserving poor,
and relief was tailored to meet the needs of the needy and to discourage the
dissolute. Independent private social agencies could make these distinc-
tions without bias. The preference for private rather than public relief was
further strengthened by the general low regard for the capacity of local
governments, which were run by local machine politicians and staﬀed by
untrained politicos as rewards for political service.6 Public relief agencies
were tainted by the possibility of the using relief for political purposes. Pa-
tronage and political inﬂuence—political manipulation—rather than the
interests of the poor were believed to motivate public relief.7
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6. On the general low opinion in which local government was held by public administra-
tion experts and political scientists in the early years of the twentieth century see Brock (1988,
pp. 50–83). “When Americans used the word ‘politician’ in a derogatory sense (as they often
did), they had most in mind the local oﬃcial in city wards, townships, or counties seeking pa-
tronage and spoils, favoring friends, juggling contracts, and acknowledging some obligation
to their party but none to the community. Civic reformers, students of public administration,
and almost every issue of the American Political Science Review produced abundant evidence
of local incompetence” (p. 51).
7. “There was ample evidence in the reports of the studies already mentioned that this sys-
tem [pre–New Deal local relief] encouraged petty graft as well as the use of relief for political
power. Merchants sometimes failed to report the death of customers who were on the relief
lists and continued to collect for their private tills the pittances of the dead from the relief
funds of the town or county. Legal restrictions on pauper voting were usually not enforced in
the states where they existed. Hence men and women on relief built up a solid vote for oﬃcials
from whom they got relief” (Brown 1940, p. 16).The sharp division between the proponents of private and public relief is
clear evidence of the deep-rooted concern over competence, political ma-
nipulation, and corruption in the administration of public relief.8 It is very
diﬃcult to credibly measure the extent of corruption in the administration
of relief before, during, or after the New Deal. It is, however, a matter of
historical record that a signiﬁcant share of relief was administered by
private social welfare agencies before 1933, and that private administration
was preferred to public administration largely on grounds of competence,
political manipulation, and corruption. These fears did not miraculously
disappear in 1933. As we discuss, private social workers continued to argue
that public relief was potentially corrupt well into the mid-1930s. By the
1950s, when social welfare advocates continued to complain about the in-
adequacy of relief in the state-administered categorical programs, charges
of political manipulation were much less common.9 This is clear historical
evidence of a reduction in its prevalence in the administration of relief over
the course of the New Deal.
Because of the dominance of the private relief administration in the
1920s, it came as a surprise when the newly formed Committee on Social
Statistics reported in 1929 that, in ﬁfteen large cities, 71.6 percent of all re-
lief funds, whether disbursed by public or private agencies, came from lo-
cal governments.10 Relief, it turned out, was often publicly ﬁnanced even
where it was privately administered. As the depression deepened, both
public and private sources of funds were called upon. The growing burden
of relieving the unemployed was well beyond the ability of private agencies,
and relief spending by local, and eventually state, governments rose
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8. “Most relief workers on either the private or public side were chieﬂy bent on destructive
criticism and critical comment regarding the opposition” (Brown 1940, p. 45). “The commu-
nity of interests in public welfare shared by both the voluntary social agency and the political
authority have not always prevented the private agency from viewing the government as an
inimical and antagonistic body opposed to the constituents of the private agency, instead of
being their political creature and the medium of their democratic expression of their ideals
and purposes” (Joseph Logan, quoted in Brown 1940, p. 53). Brown’s ﬁrst chapter is a dis-
cussion of the national, state, and local responsibility for relief and the conﬂict between
private and public relief advocates.
9. Brock (1988), Brown (1940), and Katz (1986, pp. 36–57) talk extensively about the prob-
lem of politics, corruption, and relief prior to the 1930s. Historical studies of the post–New
Deal programs spend almost no time discussing corruption. Harsh critics of the welfare sys-
tem, such as Piven and Cloward (1993) and Katz (1986), argue that relief has become an in-
strument of social control but concede that relief has become more professionally adminis-
tered. There is little discussion of corruption in the distribution of relief funds after the New
Deal. Patterson (1967, 1986) discusses the problem of corruption prior to the New Deal and
the political debates between Congress and Roosevelt during the New Deal.
10. See Brown (1940, p. 55). “The amazement with which this information was received
and the signiﬁcance attached to it are shown by the extent to which the ﬁgures are cited in the
literature of the period. They appear like a refrain, in conference papers and reports, maga-
zine articles, statements of policy and recommendations for programs put out by national and
local agencies, both public and private. They are quoted with satisfaction and triumph by pro-
ponents of public welfare and with some consternation and trepidation by private agency ex-
ecutives” (Brown, p. 56).steadily.11 Public relief oﬃcials, who had taken a backseat to professional
private social workers for decades, began exerting a larger inﬂuence in
planning for a larger relief eﬀort. But the leaders of the social work move-
ment had their roots in private social agencies, and these leaders assumed
important positions in the national government after 1933. They brought
with them the idea that local public relief administration was ineﬃcient
and subservient to politics.
Those ideas posed problems for Roosevelt and Hopkins when they be-
gan operations under FERA. The dominant philosophy of private social
work in the 1920s was to determine what was best for each relief recipient
on a case-by-case basis, allowing the local relief agency the maximum de-
gree of ﬂexibility and discretion in spending money. The prospect of dis-
tributing $500 million in federal government funds through the existing
system of local public relief agencies presented a nightmare of accounta-
bility for Hopkins. Giving control of the funds to state and local public re-
lief agencies seemed guaranteed to exacerbate the use of relief for political
and corrupt purposes. Giving control of the funds to private agencies
seemed guaranteed to insure that millions of decisions about who would
receive how much relief would be made by social workers in the best inter-
est of the needy, with no possibility of consistently explaining why one per-
son received relief and another did not.
Roosevelt and Hopkins were in a hurry, however, and their initial deci-
sions about FERA reﬂected the need to start quickly. In the summer of
1933 they had to ﬁgure out how to get hundreds of millions of dollars in re-
lief to millions of families throughout the country. FERA required Hop-
kins to distribute the money to the states, even though most states had no
formal structure for administering relief. The understanding was that most
of the money would be distributed by local relief agencies. Hopkins and
FERA were given some discretion in passing out money between the states
(in the initial $500 million appropriation, half the money allocated by
matching state and local contributions and the other half as allocated at
the discretion of the administrator on the basis of need). By November
1933 the rule-based matching features of the allocation were dispensed
with and Hopkins was given full discretion to pass out the funds to the
states while taking into account need and state and local contributions to
the eﬀort. Hopkins could use this discretionary ﬁscal power to inﬂuence
the standards of relief administration within individual states. The origi-
nal appropriation seriously underestimated the nation’s relief needs. The
FERA spent roughly $4,000 million between the summer of 1933 and
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11. New York was the ﬁrst state to establish an unemployment relief agency, the Tempo-
rary Emergency Relief Administration (TERA) in May 1931. Roosevelt was governor, and
Harry Hopkins was appointed the ﬁrst TERA administrator. By May of 1933, twenty-two
states had provided some money for unemployment relief, but not all states had a function-
ing state relief administration.the summer of 1935, under a series of emergency Congressional appropri-
ations.
Hopkins made three key administrative decisions in 1933: (a) all relief
funds would be spent by public agencies; (b) relief beneﬁts would be set on
a case by case basis using a need basedstandard;12(c) FERA would enforce
the highest standards of relief administration possible, would use the threat
of withholding funds to enforce and persuade state and local relief admin-
istrations to meet those standards, and would vigorously prosecute state
and local relief oﬃcials who used relief for their own political purposes.
With the establishment of these rules, Hopkins began to implement pro-
cedures to insure the eﬃcient administration of relief. The FERA initiated
a program requiring each state to ﬁle monthly ﬁnancial and administrative
reports, detailing case loads, beneﬁt payments, and administrative costs in
each county. Hopkins continually pressed states to increase the amount of
funding they provided for relief, to raise the standards of relief administra-
tion, and to reduce corruption and the political use of relief. But Hopkins
was continually frustrated in these eﬀorts. A FERA monthly grant was
legally the property of the state it was granted to. Hopkins could only
threaten to withhold funds from a state, severely constraining his ability to
aﬀect the administration of relief within a state. Eventually, FERA estab-
lished a division of investigation that looked into over a thousand com-
plaints (ranging from the trivial to the felonious). Yet even here Hopkins
became frustrated because FERA’s decentralized structure meant that the
states were responsible for the investigations and the attention paid to root-
ing out fraud and corruption varied signiﬁcantly across states.
The goal of FERA was getting the maximum amount of relief to the
largest number of people, quickly, and with a minimum of administrative
costs.13 The state and local share of relief expenditures varied from a high
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12. Local relief agencies investigated each case, determined the amount of resources avail-
able to each family or individual in need, and then determined the beneﬁts to be paid each
month as the diﬀerence between the families’ available resources and the relief “standard” for
families of a given size. This reﬂected the philosophy of private social work that each case
should be treated individually. This opened the door to wrangling about the determination of
beneﬁts. On the other hand, it was popular with the social workers who staﬀed local relief
agencies and it gave the entire relief structure an inherent ﬁscal ﬂexibility. Since beneﬁts were
determined case by case on the basis of need, it was relatively easy, when budgets got tight, to
reduce all beneﬁts slightly. Had beneﬁts been ﬂat and ﬁxed, adjustments to budget ﬂuctua-
tions would have had to come in the number of cases rather than the generosity of beneﬁts,
which was something everyone wanted to avoid. Budget ﬂexibility turned out to be important:
the initial FERA appropriation was intended to last two years but was exhausted by the fall
of 1933. The FERA received new appropriations roughly every six months. The ﬂow of na-
tional, state, and local funds to local relief agencies was never steady.
13. During the winter of 1933–34, Roosevelt established the Civil Works Administration
(CWA), which was a temporary program designed to provide jobs for 4 million unemployed.
The CWA was a “national” program, in the sense that the federal government issued checks to
individual recipients, and CWA administrators nominally worked for the federal government.
In eﬀect, the CWA was largely administered by FERA personnel. Most were state and local
employees temporarily transferred to the federal government’s payroll during the winter.of 62 percent in Rhode Island to a low of 5.4 percent in Alabama. There
was constant friction between FERA and state governments over the ad-
ministration and ﬁnancing of relief. Hopkins threatened to withhold
FERA grants to several states that refused to increase state contributions.
The disputes were signiﬁcant in twelve states. He made good on his threat
to withhold funds in Colorado and Missouri. Dissatisfaction with the way
relief was administered led Hopkins to take over, or “federalize,” the ad-
ministration of relief in six states.14 In North Dakota, Governor Langer
was indicted and convicted for extorting kickbacks from federal govern-
ment employees, although he wiggled out of serving jail time. In Ohio,
Governor Davey had a feud with Hopkins over the administration of relief.
When Roosevelt ﬁnally authorized the federalization of relief in Ohio, his
letter began “My Dear Mr. Hopkins: I have examined the evidence con-
cerning corrupt political inﬂuence with relief in the State of Ohio. Such in-
terference cannot be tolerated for a moment. I wish you to pursue these
investigations diligently and let the chips fall where they may. This
administration will not permit the relief population of Ohio to become the
innocent victims of either corruption or political chicanery.”15
Roosevelt reaped enormous political gains from the relief programs:
he was seen as the source of relief for millions of American families. At the
same time, garnering the credit for relief obligated Roosevelt to bear the
political costs of corruption and political manipulation when it was ex-
posed.16 Roosevelt might be willing to risk appearing to be playing politics
in distributing relief funds if he received the beneﬁts. Roosevelt, however,
received no direct beneﬁts from corruption and political manipulation by
others in the system. Thus, Roosevelt’s interest in a system that would not
be corrupted or manipulated at the state and local levels were at odds with
the interests of individual Democratic senators, congressmen, governors,
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14. The six states were Oklahoma, North Dakota, Massachusetts, Ohio, Georgia, and
Louisiana. Federal oﬃcials federalized relief in Oklahoma on 2/23/34 when the governor an-
nounced that he would not apply for relief unless he had control over the distribution; in
North Dakota on 3/1/34 as the result of charges that employees of the state relief administra-
tion were being assessed for political contributions; for work relief in Massachusetts on 3/7/
34 because the state had a statute that all grants from the state had to be distributed on a pop-
ulation basis, not on a need basis; in Ohio on 3/16/35 in a dispute over whether Ohio had sup-
plied a fair share of relief funds; and in Louisiana (4/8/35) and Georgia (4/19/35) due to long-
running disputes between the governors and federal administrators over the use of the funds.
Hopkins withheld funds from Colorado in December 1933 and from Missouri in April 1935
until the state legislatures produced funds to help pay for relief. Threats to withhold funds
went out to Alabama and Kentucky in 1933 and to Illinois in 1934. See E. A. Williams (1939,
pp. 170–78, 203–5).
15. As quoted in Brown (1940), p. 210.
16. The “political economy of New Deal spending” literature provides a thorough, but
somewhat inconclusive, picture of the overall use of federal allocation of grants between the
states for political purposes. See the citations in footnote 1. There is evidence that Hopkins
was in direct contact with relief administrations in large cities, including important and in-
ﬂuential Democratic machine politicians. See Dorsett (1977).mayors, and state legislators who beneﬁted much less from relief if they
could not use it for their own political purposes.
The decision to make FERA a joint eﬀort of national, state, and local
governments was mandated by the national emergency in 1933. There was
no other way to spend several billion dollars on relief on short notice with-
out using the existing relief bureaucracy. The decisions made by Harry
Hopkins about how relief would be administered inevitably involved set-
ting the interests of the federal government at odds with state and local
governments and, critically, involved conﬂicts between the president and
Congress over how the relief program should be structured. Out of the res-
olution of these conﬂicts emerged the modern welfare state.
11.4 Relief after 1935
Planning for a more permanent relief system began in 1933. From
FERA’s beginning its loose administrative structure embroiled Hopkins in
arguments with governors and state relief systems across the country about
how much ﬁnancial support state governments would provide, how relief
beneﬁts were to be determined, what constituted adequate relief, whether
relief was to be given in cash or in kind, and over state and local eﬀorts to
bend the administration of relief to serve political ends. Characteristically,
Republicans accused Hopkins of playing politics with relief while Democ-
rats accused Hopkins of appointing Republicans to important relief posts.
There was no happy medium for Hopkins. His only certain solution to cor-
ruption was to create a national relief agency, staﬀed by civil servants an-
swerable only to Hopkins; that solution was not acceptable to Congress or
state and local governments. The compromise reached in 1935 enabled
Hopkins and the federal government to put some bounds on the agency
problem they faced in allocating federal relief at the local level.17
The second stage of New Deal relief administration was marked by the
passage of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 (ERAA) and
the Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA). The two bills embodied the com-
promise between the president and the Congress. Both bills were intro-
duced in January; the ERAA was passed in March and the SSA in August.
Two distinctions were critical: between employable and unemployable per-
sons and between the emergency and the permanent relief programs. The
ERAA appropriated $4.8 billion for the relief of the unemployed, to be
spent at the discretion of the president, through agencies unnamed in the
bill but to be created under its authority (these ultimately included the
WPA, REA, FSA, and NYA). This was emergency legislation: a one-time,
temporary appropriation of funds for the relief of employable persons
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17. The compromise between Congress and Roosevelt in 1935 is studied in detail in Wallis
(1991).(people who would have been employed had it not been for the Depres-
sion).18The emergency appropriation was intended to tide the country over
until the “permanent” relief structure could be put in place.
The SSA created the permanent program. Congress placed old age in-
surance under the administration of the national Social Security Board.
Administration of the categorical relief programs was lodged with state
governments and ﬁnanced by matching national grants. Unemployment
insurance was funded by a nationally administered payroll tax. Unem-
ployment insurance (UI) programs were administered by state govern-
ments, which could draw on their individual state funds. Because states had
a right to draw on their UI funds and the rules in categorical programs
called for federal matching of qualiﬁed state expenditures, the national
government had virtually no control over spending in this part of the wel-
fare system.19 Although the Social Security Board was responsible for ap-
proving the initial design of state programs, actual administration of the
programs was left up to the states. Signiﬁcantly, the board was explicitly
prohibited from interfering with personnel policies of the state adminis-
tration or withholding matching funds because of personnel policies. Con-
trol over patronage in unemployment insurance and categorical relief pro-
grams was ﬁrmly located at the state and local level. The board did have
some ability to enforce standards of relief administration, a power that be-
came important later. During the FERA administration, Hopkins had
used the threat of withholding funds and federalizing relief to pressure
state relief administrations. Those tools were taken away from the national
administration in the SSA.
The elements of the compromise were clear. Roosevelt was given a free
hand in the administration of emergency relief for the remainder of the De-
pression. The emergency programs created under the ERAA, of which the
WPA was the most important, provided the lion’s share of relief for the rest
of the 1930s. How Roosevelt used his authority was up to him, subject to
Congress’s power to approve further appropriations. Congressional De-
mocrats lost the immediate advantage of controlling relief. But their posi-
tion as the majority party was strengthened by the prospect of Roosevelt’s
reelection, and they could reasonably expect to share in some of the bene-
ﬁts of administering relief through the normal political process. Roosevelt
and Hopkins could not aﬀord to alienate powerful congressional interests.
And in the permanent program almost all of the discretionary powers over
relief administration had been reserved for the states. There the national
government’s hands were tied, ﬁscally and administratively.
Private social welfare professionals were incensed at what they perceived
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18. There were also Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts in 1936, 1937, 1938, and 1939.
19. The Social Security Board could exercise ﬁscal inﬂuence in times of crisis. For example,
when states exhausted their unemployment insurance trust funds, the board could impose ad-
ministrative changes on states in return for providing funds.to be a betrayal of their basic principles. Control over the permanent relief
program was given back to the states. National support and administration
of relief were abandoned. Responsibility for general relief, relief for those
who did not ﬁt into a category of relief supported under the Social Secu-
rity program, was returned to local governments. Only the needy who were
unemployed, aged, blind, or dependent children came under the protection
of the federal system. The social welfare professionals feared that the com-
promise of 1935 cast relief back into the realm of politics: “One of the
greatest diﬃculties in the way of sound organization [after 1935] was polit-
ical interference with legislation and standards of personnel....  T h e  fact
remains that much of the confusion and many of the backward steps taken
in state and local administration were due to political pressures” (Brown
1940, p. 321).
11.5 Congress and the Politics of Relief: Geography and Jurisdiction
Political institutions that endure must provide political actors with in-
centives to maintain the system. Prior to 1933, local governments domi-
nated the provision of public relief and the ﬁnancing of private relief. Ac-
cepted wisdom was that local public relief could be used more eﬀectively
for political purposes than private relief: relief was more likely to go to the
politically connected needy, or at least to those in need willing to pledge
their vote; that relief expenditures were likely to line the pockets of patrons;
that funds were likely to go to wards or counties where votes mattered; and
that administrative jobs went not to those with professional training but
those enjoying political patronage. If the New Deal relief programs chal-
lenged these local prerogatives, why did politicians elected from state and
local constituencies support the New Deal reforms? Or, as many have ar-
gued, did elected politicians support New Deal relief programs because
they believed that they perpetuated, rather than reformed, the local politi-
cal abuses of relief?
In this section, we examine the passage of New Deal legislation to de-
termine whether Congress played politics with relief. Did the House and
Senate design the rules and administrative authority in the relief bills in
ways that enhanced their own gains from the relief programs? First, diﬀer-
ences between House and Senate versions of the same bill are examined to
see if the two branches of Congress designed the rules for allocating funds
between large and small states in a predictable way. Large states are better
represented in the House and small states in the Senate. These diﬀerences
provide a simple and clean test of whether politics mattered in the political
economy of New Deal spending. Second, diﬀerences between House and
Senate versions of the same bill are scrutinized to see if the House was more
likely to create administrative discretion and authority at the local level
and if the Senate was more likely to create administrative discretion and
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ministrative discretion, these results give us an indirect indication of what
politicians hoped to accomplish by structuring the relief programs in par-
ticular ways. The ten important pieces of relief legislation during the New
Deal are listed in tables 11.3 and 11.4.
Congress inﬂuenced the geographical allocation of relief spending in
two ways. First, within a given program legislation could specify that funds
be spent in a particular way or according to a given formula. For example,
in the Federal Emergency Relief Act, HR 4606 72nd Congress, the Senate
bill appropriated $500 million to be divided between a $300 million match-
ing fund ($3 state to $1 national matching rate) and a $200 million discre-
tionary fund to be allocated by the relief administrator. The House bill al-
located $250 million to each fund. The Act was ultimately passed with the
House allocation. We can compare how the $50 million would have been
allocated under the House and Senate versions, using the actual allocation
of funds in the discretionary and matching funds to guide the counterfac-
tual. Alternatively, Congress could have distributed funds between pro-
grams with diﬀerent patterns of allocation. In the ERAA of 1935, HR 9830
73rd Congress, the Senate proposed a transfer of $100 million in FERA
funds to the Public Works Administration (PWA); the House version did
not transfer the funds. Since FERA and the PWA expenditures across
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Table 11.3 Regressions for the 48 states of the diﬀerence in predicted spending between the
House and Senate versions of bills on the voting share in House
Act title Bill number Constant Votes R2 Critical vote
Emergency Relief and Construction Act  HR 12445 –0.601 14.39 0.03 15.2
of 1932 (–1.75) (–1.22)
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1933 HR 4606 –0.03 3.89 0.13 2.8
(–0.72) (–2.60)
Emergency Appropriation Act of 1935 HR 9830 –11.38 277.51 0.14 15
(–2.99) (–2.71)
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 HJR 117 –6.49 157.26 0.22 15.1
(–5.07) (–3.59)
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936 HR 12624 –1.38 33.71 0.42 14.9
(–8.22) (–5.86)
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1938 HJR 361 –0.82 19.81 0.08 15.1
(–2.90) (–2.04)
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1939 HJR 679 0.18 –4.13 0.0007 15.9
(–0.27) (–0.18)
Notes and sources: The dependent variable in all regressions is the diﬀerence in per capita spending be-
tween the House and Senate versions of the bill in each state. The independent variable in each regres-
sion is the state’s share of total votes in the House of Representatives. There are forty-eight state obser-
vations, and all regressions have forty-six degrees of freedom. The t-statistics are in parentheses below
the coeﬃcients. Allocations in House and Senate bills taken from copies of the bills in the Law Library,
Library of Congress, as described in Wallis (1981).states were diﬀerent, we can compare the House and Senate allocations by
examining how the $100 million would have been spent under the two pro-
posals.
The diﬀerence between the House and Senate allocation of funds to state
i is
(1) DF i   House allocationi   Senate allocationi.
The proposition that the House will allocate more funds to large states bet-
ter represented in the House than in the Senate can be tested using the re-
gression
(2) DF i   a   b   Voting Sharei,
where the independent variable is the voting share of state i in the House.
The House and Senate diﬀered over the allocation of funds in seven of
the ten pieces of New Deal relief legislation. Estimates of equation (2) for
those seven bills are shown in table 11.3. The dollar diﬀerences ranged be-
tween $50 million and $200 million, signiﬁcant amounts of money but
fairly small portions of the overall appropriations. In ﬁve of those cases the
diﬀerences between the House and Senate versions were positively and sta-
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Table 11.4 Features of relief bills where the Senate version favored state interests over
local interests
Senate bill favored state over local interests?
Bill Project  Recipient 
Bill title number Money Patronage selection selection
Emergency Relief and Construction Act 
of 1932 HR 12445 Yes
Emergency Relief Act of 1933 HR 4606 No Yes
Act of February 15, 1934 HR 7527 Yes Yes
Emergency Appropriation Act of 1935 HR 9830 Yes
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
of 1935 HJR 117 Yes Yes Yes
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
of 1936 HJR 12624 Yes Yes
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
of 1937 HJR 326 Yes Yes
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
of 1938 HJR 361 Yes Yes
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act 
of 1939 HJR 679 Yes Yes Yes
Notes and sources:Entries correspond to diﬀerences in the House and Senate versions of each bill, where
Yes means that the Senate version favored state over local interests; No means that the Senate version
did not favor state over local interests; and blank cells mean that there was no diﬀerence in this aspect
of the House and Senate versions of the programs. House and Senate bills taken from copies of the bills
in the Law Library, Library of Congress, as described in Wallis (1981).tistically signiﬁcantly related to a state’s voting share in the House. In the
other two cases the coeﬃcients were statistically insigniﬁcant, one positive
and the other negative. Geographical interests in most cases were an im-
portant determinant of diﬀerences between the House and Senate.
A curiosity of the regression results lends additional support to the geo-
graphic story. We can solve for the voting share in the House that results in
no diﬀerence between the House and Senate versions (that is, x   –a/b
from equation [2]). The last column in table 11.3 lists the implied “critical
size” for each regression estimate. In six of the seven cases, states with ﬁf-
teen votes in the House received more money from the House bill than the
Senate bill. Only nine states had 14 or more votes in the House, but the to-
tal vote of those states was 217, one vote shy of a majority of the 435 House
votes. The nine states that, on average, beneﬁted more from the House ver-
sion than the Senate version were the minimum number of states required
to pass legislation in the House.
The House and Senate allocations diﬀer in systematic and understand-
able ways. Unemployment, and therefore relief spending at the state level,
was concentrated in the large industrial states of the northeast and upper
Midwest. These states were much better represented in the House, and the
House pursued programs that allocated relative large amounts of money to
large states. An important way of doing that was through matching grants,
since the more wealthy, industrial, and hard-hit states spent more of their
own state and local funds on relief and therefore qualiﬁed for larger match-
ing grants. The Senate, on the other hand, tended to prefer (relative to the
House) programs and methods of allocation that favored the geographi-
cally large, sparsely populated states of the west and Midwest. They pre-
ferred allocation formulas, like population or land size, that funneled more
money into the west. They also showed a strong preference for large public
works projects, like the type conducted by Harold Ickes and the PWA, lo-
cated primarily in western states with an abundance of public land, over the
small, often urban work relief projects conducted by Harry Hopkins and
the WPA.20
Jurisdictional diﬀerences between the House and Senate were more
marked and more important than geographic diﬀerences. Jurisdictional
matters determined which level of government possessed elements of ad-
ministrative discretion. Geographical diﬀerences usually arose over sub-
stantial amounts of money but were minor in relation to the whole relief
package, and they never proved to be a signiﬁcant impediment to the pas-
sage of legislation. Jurisdictional disputes, however, were fought over cen-
tral issues of administrative control and, on at least one occasion, were ca-
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20. The importance of land area in the literature on the political economy of New Deal
spending reﬂects the geographic diﬀerences between the east and west. See Wallis (1998) and
the ensuing exchange between Fleck (2001) and Wallis (2001).pable of bringing the whole legislative process to a halt.21 There were four
dimensions of administrative discretion: decisions about money, patron-
age, project selection, and recipient selection. In general, we expect the
House to locate administrative control over these functions at the local
level and the Senate to locate control at the state level. table 11.4 lists the
ten relief bills, whether there was a diﬀerence in one of these four areas, and
whether the diﬀerence was as expected. An example from each category
follows.
Money: The very ﬁrst relief bill, HR 12445 72nd Congress, authorized
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to make loans to the
states for relief purposes. The Senate version of the bill restricted RFC
loans to the states. Local governments could not apply. The House version
of the bill allowed cities to apply directly to the RFC for loans, rather than
going through the state government. In this case the House version was
adopted.
Patronage: In the ERAA of 1935, the House proposed that any county
relief agency be required to hire its administrative employees from the res-
idents of that county, which would have given local relief authorities and
congressmen strong control over patronage. The Senate version stipulated
that administrative employees within a state had to live within the state, but
employees from one county could be hired in another county. Neither re-
strictive residency requirement survived in the ﬁnal bill.
Project selection: Under the WPA, a class of projects called “federal
projects” were ﬁnanced and administered directly by the WPA with no
state or local sponsorship. The most prominent of these were the art and
theater projects. In the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1939, both
versions of the bill eliminated all federal theater projects, and the House
version of the bill required that any new federal projects have a local spon-
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21. The case where a jurisdictional dispute prevented any legislation from passing was, in-
terestingly, a relief bill proposed in the last Hoover Congress. The jurisdiction at issue was na-
tional versus state. In January of 1932 a bill sponsored by Senators LaFollette and Costigan,
72nd Congress S. 3045, proposed the creation of a Federal Emergency Relief Board that
would be given $375 million to allocate between the states for relief purposes and an equal
amount for highway construction. Forty percent of the $375 million would be divided be-
tween the states on the basis of population, the remainder to be allocated at the discretion of
the relief board. The bill failed to pass the Senate, but not because of lack of support for re-
lief. A substitute bill was proposed by Senators Black, Walsh, and Bulkley, which diﬀered in
only two ways. The substitute bill provided loans rather than grants and allocated all of the
$375 million on the basis of population, thereby eliminating the need for a federal board of
any kind. The substitute bill failed by a vote of 48 to 31, and the original bill failed the next
day, after extensive debate, by a vote of 48 to 35. Only ﬁfteen senators voted for both bills—
in all eighty-one senators had expressed voting support for some kind of relief program. The
bill failed to pass because of diﬀerences over how the program should be administered, specif-
ically whether the states should answer to a national relief board or be completely free to ad-
minister relief on their own. Since only a handful of states had any existing relief program, the
struggle in the Senate was over administrative arrangements that might be created, not inter-
ests that already existed.sor. The Senate bill had no provision for local sponsorship. The local spon-
sorship provision stayed in the ﬁnal bill.
Recipient selection: There was never a hard and fast legislative decision
on who should select the recipients for the WPA. In practice, local relief
agencies “referred” potential recipients to the WPA, and it was usually im-
possible to receive a WPA relief job without the referral.22 Local relief
agencies were not paid, at least not directly, for this task and so eﬀectively
remained independent of the WPA. Hopkins and the WPA several times
requested funds from Congress to pay local relief agencies for providing re-
ferral services, and a provision for payment was included in several Senate
bills. In every case the provision was eliminated from the bill by the House.
Hopkins was unable to exert even indirect control on local recipient selec-
tion by providing money for the referral service, money that could have
been withheld or reduced.
These examples are indicative of House and Senate concerns in relief leg-
islation. As table 11.4 shows, diﬀerences in the kind of administrative ar-
rangements preferred by the House and Senate were frequent, persistent,
and systematic. In seventeen of the eighteen cases where the House and
Senate diﬀered over administrative procedures, the diﬀerences are as pre-
dicted.23 Both senators and congressmen were interested in locating ad-
ministrative control of the relief program at the level of government where
they exercised the most control.
11.6 Roosevelt’s Interests: Comparing the Intrastate Allocation 
of FERA and WPA Funds
Dividing administrative control over relief between national, state, and
local governments was the key element in the compromise of 1935. Con-
gress located administrative control over the permanent categorical relief
programs, unemployment insurance, and general relief at the state level.
The national government was given control of the emergency relief pro-
grams and the permanent social insurance program. Roosevelt and Hop-
kins were given a blank check for $4.8 billion in the ERAA of 1935. The
magnitude of the change in New Deal relief administration cannot be un-
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22. It was possible to get a nonrelief WPA job without a referral. These jobs were either
supervisory or administrative. See Howard (1943, pp. 356–65) for a discussion of referral
policy.
23. The one anomaly is a special case. In the original Federal Emergency Relief Act the
Senate inserted a provision enabling the federal government to take over the administration
of relief in a state. This was called “federalizing” relief, and it clearly weakened state inde-
pendence, which we would not expect the Senate to do. Later, in 1934, Senator McAdoo from
California asked Hopkins to federalize relief in California, because he was in a political battle
with the faction of the party controlling the relief administration. It appears that the anom-
aly in table 11.5 was the result of the anticipated political gains that would come to Senators
from “federalization.” Those gains, it turns out, never materialized.derestimated. Although control of the permanent welfare program re-
mained largely with the states, the permanent program took time to imple-
ment. For the remainder of the 1930s and the depression, the national gov-
ernment would be the largest provider of relief in the country, and the
ERAA of 1935 gave Roosevelt and Hopkins wide latitude and discretion in
how they administered that relief.
The WPA succeeded FERA as the primary national program for the
relief of the unemployed. Like FERA, the WPA under Hopkins provided
work relief to over 2 million cases each month. Under the FERA structure,
Hopkins had not possessed the discretion to allocate funds within states.
When a state strayed from the administration’s goals, the public was likely
to blame the Roosevelt administration as much as or more than they
blamed the state and local politicians. To guide the state back to the proper
path, Hopkins could try friendly persuasion or go to the extreme of with-
drawing funds or federalizing relief. But he had no intermediate punish-
ments. This was not a problem under the centralized structure of the WPA.
The WPA’s administrative employees worked directly for the federal gov-
ernment, and the WPA administrators controlled the intrastate allocations
of WPA funds.24
The next section examines the WPA rules and procedures adopted by
Hopkins to control illegal corruption in the distribution of relief. This sec-
tion examines how centralization limited political manipulation in the dis-
tribution of funds. Roosevelt’s critics argued that greater federal control
under the WPA allowed Roosevelt and Hopkins to better manipulate relief
allocations for political purposes. If we are correct that Hopkins and Roo-
sevelt sought to limit political manipulation by state and local oﬃcials
within the states, we should see that the distribution of relief within states
more closely matched the stated goals of relief, recovery, and reform under
the WPA than under FERA and that political considerations had less in-
ﬂuence on intrastate allocations under the WPA than under FERA. Infor-
mation on the allocation of WPA and FERA spending from over 3,000
counties is used to examine the diﬀerences in the intrastate distribution of
WPA and FERA funds. In order to compare allocation policies directly,
the values for every variable (dependent and independent) for each county
are normalized by subtracting the state mean for that variable and then by
dividing the diﬀerence by the standard deviation within the same state. As
a result every variable has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1
within each state. This facilitates comparison of the coeﬃcients determin-
ing spending for FERA, the WPA, and the diﬀerence between the twopro-
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24. There is one caveat. The WPA’s grants were not distributed in the absence of state and
local activity. States and local jurisdictions lobbied for and spent resources to obtain funds
from both FERA and the WPA. Some of the diﬀerence in the distribution within states under
the WPA and the FERA may reﬂect diﬀerences in state and local behavior, as well as diﬀer-
ences in Hopkins’s administrative policy.grams.25 We include key variables that inﬂuence the distribution of relief
grants, as discussed in the literature on the allocation of New Deal funds.
One group of variables measures economic conditions across counties
that reﬂect the New Deal’s stated goals of relieving ﬁnancial distress, pro-
moting recovery, and redistributing income. Relief spending should have
been positively related to a measure of unemployment (measured in the
1930 census), negatively related to economic growth from 1929 to 1933
(measured as the change in log retail sales per capita between 1929 and
1933), negatively related to a measure of the share of high-income people
(the percent of the population paying income taxes in 1929), and negatively
related to a measure of average consumption in 1929 (retail sales per capita
in 1929). Unemployment relief programs were targeted at urban areas, so
the coeﬃcient on percent urban should be positive.
The second group of variables reﬂects political factors. The Roosevelt
administration may have used the allocation of funds to promote their
prospects for reelection by rewarding long-term loyal Democrats (mea-
sured by the mean percent voting Democrat in presidential elections from
1896 through 1928), by trying to attract voters who were relatively ﬁckle in
their support of the Democrats (measured by the standard deviation of the
percent voting Democrat from 1896 through 1928), by rewarding voters
who swung to Roosevelt in 1932 (the percent voting for Roosevelt in 1932
minus the mean percent voting Democrat from 1896 through 1928), or by
spending more in areas with higher turnout (the number of presidential
votes in 1932 relative to the population in 1930).26
The ﬁrst two speciﬁcations in table 11.5 show the results for the WPA
and FERA separately. With regard to the economic variables, both pro-
grams provided more funds per capita in urban areas, provided more funds
in counties with higher unemployment, and provided fewer funds to
higher-income counties as measured by retail sales per capita. The FERA
provided more funds, while the WPA provided fewer funds, to counties
with higher tax returns per capita. On the political side, both FERA and
WPA gave less money to counties that traditionally voted Democratic and
more money to counties that swung to Roosevelt in 1932 and that had
higher voter turnout. The FERA gave more funds to counties with higher
variance in their party voting, while the WPA gave less to these counties.
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25. We have also explored using the ratio of the county observation to the state mean and
had the same general results. We have also run the analysis by demeaning the variable but not
normalizing. Demeaning the variables does not completely eliminate the scale diﬀerences be-
tween the WPA and the FERA. The WPA spent more money, so that the variance in spend-
ing was likely to be higher. In such a situation the WPA and FERA could have responded to
the same diﬀerences in unemployment by raising spending by 5 percent in that county, but be-
cause the WPA spent more on average, the 5 percent will generate a larger coeﬃcient for the
WPA than for the FERA.
26. See Wright (1974); Fleck (1994, 1999, 2001); Wallis (1998, 2001); and Fishback, Kan-
tor, and Wallis (2003) for empirical analysis of relief spending using these variables.Our speciﬁc interest, however, is in the diﬀerences between the responses
of the FERA and the WPA to key variables; therefore, we focus on the third
speciﬁcation in table 11.5 where the dependent variable is per capita WPA
spending minus per capita FERA spending. The results of the comparison
are consistent with our view that when Hopkins gained more control of the
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Table 11.5 Comparison of regression coeﬃcients for factors determining the
intrastate allocation of FERA and WPA funds across counties
WPA FERA WPA minus FERA
Variable (1) (2) (3)
% urban, 1930 0.216 0.125 0.091
(7.54) (4.29) (3.27)
Tax returns per capita, 1929 –0.005 0.076 –0.081
(–0.15) (2.52) (–2.79)
Retail sales per capita, 1929 –0.208 –0.153 –0.055
(–6.74) (–4.87) (–1.84)
Retail sales per capita growth, 29–33 –0.016 –0.13 0.114
(–0.87) (–7.03) (6.44)
% unemployed, 1930 0.282 0.227 0.055
(13.9) (11.04) (2.77)
Democratic loyalty, 1896–1928 –0.061 –0.069 0.008
(–3.28) (–3.64) (0.43)
Swing, 1896–1932 –0.034 0.03 –0.064
(–1.74) (1.48) (–3.33)
Turnout, 1932 0.048 0.078 –0.03
(2.63) (4.21) (–1.69)
Roosevelt swing, 1932 0.048 0.056 –0.008
(2.25) (2.60) (–0.4)
R2 0.127 0.099 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.097 0.034
No. of observations 3061 3061 3061
Notes and sources: t-statistics in parentheses. The unit of observation is the county. The values
for the county for each variable have been normalized by subtracting the state mean and di-
viding by the state standard deviation. WPA and FERA spending information is from the U.S.
Oﬃce of Government Reports (1940). It was converted to per capita spending by dividing by
the population in 1930. Retail sales information from 1933 is from U.S. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1936). The 1929 retail sales information,
percent urban in 1930, population in 1930 and 1940, and the ratio of unemployed to gainfully
employed in 1930 are from the update of historical, demographic, economic, and social data
for the United States from 1790 by Michael Haines and ICPSR (2005). The population ﬁgures
used to create our per capita estimates for 1929 and 1933 retail spending were calculated using
linear interpolations of the 1930 and 1940 populations. The tax return information comes from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1932). The
mean Democratic share of the presidential vote from 1896 to 1928, the percent voting for Roo-
sevelt in 1932 minus the mean Democratic share from 1896 to 1928, the standard deviation of
the Democratic share of the presidential vote from 1896 to 1932, and the percent of adults vot-
ing in 1932 were all calculated using information from ICPSR’s (1999, no. 1) U.S. Historical
Election Returns, 1824–1968. The data set consists of 3,061 counties and county-city combi-
nations in the United States. The New Deal program information was reported for some com-
bined counties. For a list see Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis (2003, pp. 304–5).intrastate allocations he reduced state and local political manipulation by
focusing spending more on relief, recovery, and reform.
The WPA distributed relatively more funds within states to areas with
greater unemployment, lower economic activity, and a higher urban share
of the population. Because of the way the variables were scaled, a one-unit
change in a variable represents a change of 1 standard deviation in each
variable. A 1 standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate pro-
duced an increase in WPA funds that was 0.055 standard deviations larger
than the response by FERA. A similar increase in retail sales per capita in
1929, our measure of economic activity, was associated with a reduction in
WPA spending that was .08 standard deviations greater than for FERA
spending. A 1 standard deviation increase in percent urban led to a re-
sponse by the WPA that was .09 standard deviations larger. All three diﬀer-
ences are statistically signiﬁcant. The diﬀerential response in WPA and
FERA spending in urban areas is particularly telling. Representation in
state legislatures was skewed in favor of rural areas. The national govern-
ment was already distributing large amounts of aid to farmers through
agricultural programs. Hopkins wanted FERA and the WPA to focus on
relief of unemployed workers, not low-income farmers. Thus, when Hop-
kins gained control under the WPA he managed to shift funds back to ur-
ban areas. There is one exception in our ﬁndings. The FERA was more re-
sponsive to the depths of the crash between 1929 and 1933, as measured by
the growth (or reduction) in retail sales per capita in those years.
The results in table 11.5 for the political variables suggest that Hopkins
and Roosevelt resisted the temptation to take advantage of greater discre-
tion by more vigorously pursuing political goals when they gained more
control under the WPA. The eﬀects of long-term swing voters and voter
turnout on intrastate allocations were statistically signiﬁcantly lower by
0.06 and 0.03 for the WPA than for FERA, respectively. The response to
the Roosevelt swing voters was also lower under the WPA but not in a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant way.
The major bone of contention in the political economy of New Deal
spending debate is whether economic or political factors inﬂuenced the al-
location of federal spending. These results clearly show that when control
over the intrastate allocation of relief funds shifted from state and local
politicians to Hopkins the political inﬂuence on intrastate allocations was
reduced and intrastate allocations were more responsive to economic con-
ditions.
11.7 Rules and Procedures
The switch from the FERA to the WPA oﬀered Hopkins more than
greater discretion over how relief funds were allocated within states. It also
gave him more central authority over the monitoring of relief administra-
tion. The WPA continued FERA’s eﬀorts to collect ﬁnancial information
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federal funds, the WPA was better able to audit the ﬁnances on individual
projects whether the projects were carried out by state or local govern-
ments or by the WPA itself. Administrative discretion was reduced in sev-
eral areas. The WPA introduced a “security wage” policy that set the wages
of WPA employees according to a formula that took into account the em-
ployees’ skill, the size of the locality in which the work was performed, and
the prevailing wage for work in the area. Hours of work and standards of
construction on WPA projects were more closely controlled.
The move from the FERA to the WPA allowed Hopkins to reorganize
and strengthen the investigations of complaints concerning improper ad-
ministration of relief and corruption. Under FERA such investigations
were carried out by small staﬀs at the federal or state level. The adminis-
tration of relief “was a new problem and a new ﬁeld of investigative work,”
and the approaches taken were as “variable as the number of states them-
selves” (WPA Division of Investigation 1943, p. 1). The FERA established
a Division of Special Inquiry in October 1934 that operated out of the
Washington, D.C. oﬃce. Investigative eﬀorts often were uncoordinated
and were hampered at times by the transfer of legal ownership of relief
funds to the state on reception of the grant. States, as a result, were the pri-
mary investigators when charges were raised.
Roosevelt’s executive order creating the WPA established a “division of
progress investigation” designed “to coordinate the pertinent work of ex-
isting investigating agencies of the government so as to insure the honest
execution of the relief programs” (WPA 1943, p. 4). The division had its
own director and ﬁeld organization directly responsible to the administra-
tor. The functions of the division
covered the investigation of all complaints alleging fraud or loss to the
government or violations of Federal statutes as they applied to the ex-
penditure of relief funds. More speciﬁcally these functions included the
handling of complaints that funds were being diverted to private rather
than public beneﬁt; that false statements had been made in obtaining al-
locations or beneﬁts from relief money; that pay rolls for either personal
services or the rental of equipment by WPA were being padded; com-
plaints of extortion or kickbacks, of theft or embezzlement, or bribery or
the collection of illegal fees; that false compensation claims had been ﬁled
by WPA employees or that fraud existed in competitive bidding on gov-
ernment contracts; that vendors to the government were not delivering in
line with their contracts; that forgery had been committed in work as-
signments, time reports, or other oﬃcial documents, and other less com-
mon types of fraud in the handling of federal funds. (WPA 1943, p. 5)
The division later investigated violations of the Hatch Act, prohibiting
“pernicious political activity” and provisions passed by Congress in 1939
preventing aliens from receiving WPA employment.
A staﬀof ﬁfty was based in Washington, supplemented by ﬁeld oﬃces in
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agents peaked in number at seventy-three, supplemented by “resident
agents” throughout the country.27 There were plenty of complaints. The
records of the investigative division take up 415 cubic feet plus numerous
rolls of microﬁlm in the national archives. In 1937 alone, the division con-
ducted 3,280 investigations.
The division evaluated complaints, investigated them if necessary, and
then, if a problem was found, turned cases over to the attorney general’s
oﬃce for prosecution. The division investigated and reported on 17,352
cases. In 8,811 of these the charges were substantiated. A total of 2,215
were referred to the attorney general for criminal prosecution. Of the re-
maining 6,596 substantiated cases, 4,496 persons were dismissed, de-
moted, suspended, reprimanded, or debarred. When a subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House investigated the WPA in
1940 they could not uncover a single serious irregularity that had not pre-
viously been investigated by the division.
The switch from the FERA to the WPA gave Hopkins a great deal more
authority over the activities of state and local WPA projects. It is clear that
he took this opportunity to establish better monitoring of the programs.
He and Roosevelt were concerned that charges of corruption left to fester
and later be uncovered by congressional investigations would signiﬁcantly
damage the success of the program and ultimately the administration.
Therefore, they established a more centralized investigative division that
routinely investigated complaints and pressed for the prosecution of polit-
ical manipulation and criminal corruption.
11.8 Concluding Remarks
The modern American welfare state was created during the New Deal.
Prior to 1933, the burden of caring for the needy and unemployed fell on
local governments. By late 1935, a system of nationally funded and ad-
ministered old age insurance was in place; federally funded and state-
administered programs providing old age assistance, aid to dependent chil-
dren, aid to the blind, and UI were in place; and a substantial emergency
relief structure with both national and state components was working to
see the nation through the last years of the Depression. Before 1932, the ad-
ministration of public relief was widely regarded as politically corrupt, a
concern so prevalent that a signiﬁcant portion of the nation’s relief systems
were administered by private social welfare agencies. Although political
opponents of the New Deal often complained about the use of relief for po-
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27. Agents were often young, and 85 percent had professional or college training as
lawyers, accountants, and engineers. A number had been investigators for the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) or in other settings.litical purposes, by 1940, charges of corruption and political manipulation
had diminished considerably. Corruption and political manipulation
within the relief programs were reduced. How this contributed to the over-
all level of corruption and political manipulation in the political system
within the New Deal is not clear. The importance of political machines is
often claimed to have declined over the course of the New Deal, partly be-
cause the provision of national relief undercut the provision of local relief
by the machines. But as we have documented, part of the relief system re-
mained in the administrative hands of the local governments, albeit with
more supervision from the Social Security Board.28
The transformation of public relief in the United States occurred be-
cause of the political interests of President Roosevelt and his administra-
tion. Local oﬃcials, state politicians, and members of Congress were in a
position to use relief for political purposes: getting politically connected
people on relief, letting contracts for materials and supplies to political al-
lies, and using administrative jobs to reward loyal followers. Roosevelt, on
the other hand, had little use for this type of political machination. The
gratitude of millions of relief recipients and the general public impression
that the administration was moving decisively to relieve the worst victims
of the Depression garnered votes for Roosevelt. That support would have
evaporated if relief had been administered in a visibly corrupt manner.
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the ﬁrst New Deal relief
program, was created in the spring of 1933 to rapidly distribute millions of
dollars to families in immediate need of ﬁnancial assistance. It was impos-
sible for Roosevelt and Hopkins to solve the agency problem they faced.
The crisis forced them to distribute relief money through the established
local public relief administrations; it was the only existing structure ca-
pable of administering relief to over 4 million families each month. In-
evitably, some of the $4 billion distributed to states between 1933 and 1935
was used to further the political ends of state and local politicians. The
FERA’s loose administrative structure did not give Roosevelt and Hopkins
the administrative tools to limit local politicians from capturing some of
the rents for themselves. As we have seen, Congress was complicit in the
political maneuvering. The Senate persistently sought to allocate more
money to small states well represented in the Senate, while the House
worked to allocate more money to large states better represented in the
House. The Senate tried to locate administrative control of relief at the
state level, and the House tried to locate control at the local level. Both
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28. Dorsett concludes his study of the New Deal and the machines this way: “The second
wrong assumption is that the federal government, by assuming responsibility for welfare pro-
grams, thereby destroyed the machine’s useful role as a service institution. Actually, the dis-
tribution function was not preempted by the federal government: under the New Deal many
welfare programs were ﬁnanced in Washington, but they were directed at the local level” 
(p. 113).were generally hostile to locating administrative control at the national
level.
The deal struck in 1935 with the passage of the Emergency Relief Ap-
propriations Act and the Social Security Act gave the Roosevelt adminis-
tration authority over the distribution of emergency relief. Congress en-
sured, however, that states retained control over important elements of the
permanent relief program—unemployment insurance, aid to the blind, old
age assistance, and aid to dependent children—but were subject to federal
oversight. Although we stress the diﬀerence in the interests of Congress
and the executive branch, this should not obscure the importance that all
Democrats placed on reelecting Roosevelt. Giving Roosevelt control over
the emergency relief program allowed him to claim credit for providing re-
lief and employment to millions of families every month. Voters responded
by supporting Roosevelt. When Roosevelt and Hopkins obtained more
control over the intrastate allocation of WPA relief funds, they targeted the
allocation of funds within states more at the high-minded goals of relief, re-
covery, and reform and resisted increasing the role of presidential politics.
The other side of the bargain gave states more control over the adminis-
tration of categorical relief and unemployment insurance, as well as com-
plete ﬁscal autonomy. But state independence came with a catch. The So-
cial Security Board could not force states to spend more or less on relief,
nor could it decide who would staﬀ administrative positions, but it could
and did require that relief be administered in a fair and impartial manner.
The development of welfare entitlements and the evolution of higher stan-
dards of welfare administration in the states under the watchful eye of the
Social Security Board are a subject beyond our current story.
Our explanation for why the New Deal relief policies sought to reduce
corruption and political manipulation does not imply that Roosevelt did
not play politics with relief. It was in Roosevelt’s political interest to reduce
political manipulation and corruption in the administration of relief at the
state and local level. It was political interest, and not only enlightened so-
cial policy, that contributed to the reduction in corruption.
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